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1

Martha T. McCluskey

I. INTRODUCTION

This essay examines the question of conflict between market work and family
care from the angle of family caretaking labor for workers rather than for dependents. Feminist legal scholars and activists have been concerned for generations
about the effect of women's unpaid caretaking work on women's participation and
success in the wage labor market. 2 Better public support for this gendered family
care work is crucial to many leading visions of feminist legal and economic change.
For example, Martha Fineman argues that the state and market should take on a
greater share of the responsibility for the caretaking work now delegated primarily
to unpaid, or underpaid, women in the "private" family.3 Joan Williams advocates
revising workplace norms and employment laws to support women (and men) whose
normal life includes substantial responsibility for child care. 4 Recent welfare reforms, however, have increased the extent to which public policy treats caretaking
instead as a personalresponsibility (or a sign of personal irresponsibility) for some
women and families, particularly single women in poverty and mothers of color. 5
Prevailing politics have been somewhat more favorable to the idea that "working
mothers" deserve at least some public support for their efforts to balance family
6
care with paid labor.
1. Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo (email mcclusk@buffalo.edu).
For helpful discussion of these issues, I thank Vicki Schultz and participants at the Law and
Society Association 2002 Annual Meeting, as well as participants in the Law, Labor, and Gender
Conference at the University of Maine School of Law.
2. See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT
TO Do ABOUT IT (2000) (arguing for a change in the organization of market and family work to

end the marginalization of mothers); ALICE

KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN,

20rH CENTURY AMERICA (2001) (exploring historical
debates over the ways in which various economic rights and institutions treat women as workers
and as family caretakers).
3. Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the FoundationalMyths: Independence, Autonomy,
and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 13, 14-20 (2000).
AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN

4.

WILLIAMS,

supra note 2, at 54-63.

5. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Nature of Dependencies and Welfare "Reform," 36
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 287, 310 (1996) (criticizing policies privatizing caretaking work to the
family as a means of enforcing a patriarchal moral order); Linda C. McClain, Care as a Public
Value: Linking Responsibility, Resources, and Republicanism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1673, 1675
(2001) (criticizing the idea of "personal responsibility" informing the 1996 federal welfare reform legislation that ended the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program).
6. See McClain, supra note 5, at 1677 (acknowledging that policy makers and experts have
appropriately recognized the need for increased support for child care for low-income mothers
engaged in market work, but challenging the idea that support for care should be a means toward
more market participation by mothers); see generally Lisa D. Brush, Changing the Subject,
Gender and Welfare Regime Studies, 9 Soc. POL. 2 (2002) (analyzing feminist scholars' focus on
"working mothers" as a politically expedient strategy that challenges androcentrism without
addressing more threatening issues of masculine privilege or violence). For one example of a
conservative policy organization that supports "welfare reform" but promotes its concern for
"working mothers," see the NATIONAL CENTER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, WOMEN IN THE ECONOMY
(2002), at http://www.womenintheeconomy.org (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) (arguing that working mothers will benefit from "free market" policies such as income tax cuts and privatized
social security).
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Some critics, however, have questioned whether better public support for unpaid family caretaking is indeed a goal consistent with feminist ideals. 7 Their
challenges revive and expand longstanding debates about the problems of a feminist strategy focused on women workers' maternal responsibilities. 8 Recent debates over legal feminists' focus on family care work raise three interrelated concerns.
First, the home/market dilemma: Will directing public support to women as
unpaid caretakers discourage or disadvantage women as paid workers? To what
extent should feminist efforts be directed at supporting those-primarily womenwho decide to substitute "uncommodified" family work for the "commodified"
work assumed in law to result from an arms-length "market" exchange of money
for labor? 9
Second, the maternal/nonmaternal dilemma: Will directing public support to
women as mothers victimize or marginalize women who are not mothers or caretakers? 10 Will caretaking support reinforce "repronormativity," restricting or penalizing women's choices to be nonparents, single individuals, or nonprocreating
lesbians, for example?"I
Third, the pleasure/dependency dilemma: Will directing public resources to
women's family care for others diminish attention or support for women's freedom to seek their own pleasure? In particular, as Katherine Franke asks, has feminist legal attention to women's dependency burdens detracted from feminist legal
12
attention to women's identity as powerful sexual agents?
7. See, e.g., Symposium, The Structures of Care Work, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1389 (2001)
(collecting various commentaries on the advantages and disadvantages of different feminist approaches to supporting care work); Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000)
(arguing that feminists should focus on increasing support for women's market work, rather
than on supporting unpaid care); Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism,
Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181 (2001') (criticizing what she perceives as legal
feminism's dual focus on dependency and danger rather than on sexual pleasure).
8. See Lisa D. Brush, Love, Toil, and Trouble: Motherhood and Feminist Politics, 21 SIGNS:
J. OF WOMEN INCULTURE AND Soc'Y 429, 454 (1996) (reviewing feminist scholarship on histori-

cal debates over the relationship between motherhood, feminism, and welfare state policies).
Brush concludes that "matemalism is feminism for hard times," a strategy that has often been
unsuccessful in its attempt to circumvent attacks on women's citizenship by making children's
well-being the basis for justifying women's claims to public rights and benefits. Id. at 431,454.
9. See Schultz, supra note 7, at 14-20 (arguing that feminists should improve and increase
women's commodified market work as the foundation of citizenship); Deborah L. Rhode, Balanced Lives, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 834 (2002) (arguing for support for a balance between paid
work and unpaid pursuits as the route to meaningful lives and societal well-being); Martha M.
Ertman, Love and Work: A Response to Vicki Schultz's Life's Work, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 848
(2002) (arguing that compensation for family homemaking labor can help redefine dominant
norms governing gender, sexuality, and class).
10. See Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About
Where, Why and How the Burden of Carefor ChildrenShould be Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1753 (2002) (warning that women in nontraditional jobs and women without children may bear
much of the cost of making child caretaking a public responsibility); ELINOR BURKETT, THE BABY
BOON: How FAMILY-FRIENDLY AMERICA CHEATS THE CHILDLESS (2000) (arguing that childless women
are oppressed by policies supporting mothers).
I1. See Franke, supra note 7, at 183-86 (criticizing feminist attention to motherhood for a
failure to sufficiently question repronormativity).
12. See id. at 182-83, 186, 204 (arguing that subsidies for reproduction encourage women to
use their bodies for goals other than their own pleasure).
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My thesis is that feminists can better respond to these conundrums not by
turning away from a focus on gendered family care work, but by paying more
attention to the work/family question. A number of feminists, particularly Martha
Fineman, have framed the issue of family caretaking labor broadly as a matter of
the pervasiveness and inevitability of human dependency not just in childhood but
also, for example, in old age, sickness, and disability. 13 However, many supporters and critics of feminist family care advocacy have focused their debate more
narrowly on the question of child care. 14 I hope to develop further a broader
notion of dependency by focusing particularly on how unwaged, gendered caretaking work is critical not just to maintaining those outside of the labor marketthose typically labeled dependents I5-but also to maintaining and supporting ostensively independent workers.
Even when successfully raised from infants to adults, and even when not retired or incapacitated from wage earning, workers (and their employers) depend
on substantial caretaking services to obtain food, shelter, clothing, health care,
emotional support, social capital, job training, and transportation, among other
things. 16 The historical legal reorientation of work from domestic servitude (master/servant or master/slave relationships) to free wage labor theoretically involved
redirecting responsibility and control of this care from masters to workers. 17 But
the reconstruction of employment from a domestic status to a market contract has
also depended on reinforcing domestic status relationships by which some wage
workers and their employers can shift the costs of this care to families, communi18
ties, and their own hired domestic servants.
Many feminists have argued that employment and labor laws assume an ideal
worker free from direct responsibility for child care-an ideal based on a mascu13. Fineman, supra note 3, at 18.
14. For example, in the recent Chicago-KentLaw Review symposium issue on The Structures
of Care Work, most of the discussion focused primarily on questions of care for children. Symposium, The Structures of Care Work, 76 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1389 (2001).

15. In introducing a symposium titled The Structures of Care Work, Katharine Silbaugh defines care work as "meeting the needs of children, the elderly, the sick or the disabled." Katharine
B. Silbaugh, Forward:The Structures of Care Work, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1389, 1389 (2001).
16. See Fineman, supranote 3, at 22-23 (explaining that all of us depend throughout our lives
on varying degrees of public and private subsidies, including uncompensated care labor of others).
17. See ROBERT
ENGLISH

J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR:

& AMERICAN

LAW AND CULTURE,

THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN

1350-1870, at 56, 119, 154-55 (1991) (describing a shift

in the sociolegal status of adult white male workers in post-Revolutionary America from "dependents," analogous to wives and children, to "independent" persons obligated to maintain
themselves).
18. See AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE
MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 175-217 (1998) (explaining how the post-Civil War
development of free wage labor incorporated an assumption that wives would continue to have
a status-based duty to provide unwaged noncontractual domestic service to their husbands). See
also Brush, supra note 6 (discussing the gender division of labor as an uncommodified welfare
system inducing women to become wives who provide unpaid labor to support men, employers,
and the state); JEANNE BOYDSTON, HOME AND WORK: HOUSEWORK, WAGES, AND THE IDEOLOGY OF
LABOR IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 137 (1990) (explaining how women's unpaid household labor was
critical to industrialization in the Northeastern United States in the early nineteenth century
because it enabled employers to cut working class men's wages below subsistence levels).
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line norm.
But the ideal worker assumed by the law is also unencumbered by
direct personal care service-because that ideal market wage earner comes packaged with an unpaid servant, historically institutionalized in law as a wife-in
particular, a white heterosexual wife. 20 Workers' ability to succeed in the labor
market depends not just on how much this market labor conflicts with the family
care they give to others, but also on how much family care they can receive from
others. Feminists have discussed how prevailing labor market structures penalize
some mothers' caretaking labor with lower wages and reduced job opportunitiesthe mommy track problem. 2 1 But prevailing labor market structures also privilege
some husbands with higher wages and better opportunities-the husbands' premium. 22 The family services traditionally associated with-and legally required
of-wives' labor for husbands 23 deserve closer attention in analyzing the relationship between women's commodified and uncommodified labor.
II. NONDEPENDENT CARE AS PRODUCTVE LABOR

Many feminists and scholars have criticized how household labor was redefined from economic production to personal consumption or leisure during the
nineteenth century. 24 Dependent care is often included within this analysis of
19. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 2, at 1-6.
20. See STANLEY, supra note 18, at 182, 187-92 (discussing how the late nineteenth century's
dominant ideology recognized wives' unwaged service to wage-earning husbands as an important economic value, but that African American women were expected to sell their labor to white
employers rather than to specialize in serving their own families). See also ELIZABETH WILSON,
WOMEN AND THE WELFARE STATE

176-77 (1977) (the housewife's unwaged domestic work to

provide food, laundry, and good housing "helps to keep costs down for the employer by making

it possible for the worker to be cared for much more cheaply");

LISA LEGHORN

& KATHERINE

121 (1981) (explaining
that women are coerced into heterosexuality in part to support "a worldwide institution whereby
women service men for free within and outside the home").
21. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination-andthe Transformationof Workplace Norms,
42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1220-37, 1237 n. 197 (1989) (criticizing male norms underlying assumption that workers with parental and family responsibilities are less productive).
22. See, e.g., Kermit Daniel, The MarriagePremium, in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 113, 113-25 (Mariano Tommasi & Kathryn lerulli eds., 1995) (concluding that empirical evidence supports the theory that men earn more when married because their wives' household work and care services enhance husbands' productivity). Although the economic literature
typically describes this as a "marriage" premium, in fact the evidence suggests it is a premium
based on gender as well as on race and class. For white women, for example, marriage does not
correlate with higher wages, and white husbands earn a higher premium than black husbands.
Id. at 123.
23. See Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives'
Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2198-210 (1994) (describing how coverture
continued after nineteenth century marriage law reforms because the law continued to require
unwaged domestic service by wives to husbands); Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love:
Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 32-36 (1996) (stating that wives still have a legal
obligation to provide unpaid household services to husbands). See also WILLIAMS, supranote 2,
at 153-57 (discussing the "family wage" ideal as a white and middle- or upper-class privilege).
24. See BOYDSTON, supra note 18, at 158 (discussing the "pastoralization" of wives' services
as distinct from economic "work"); Nancy Folbre, The Unproductive Housewife, 16 SIGNS: J. OF
PARKER, WOMAN'S WORTH: SEXUAL ECONOMICS AND THE WORLD OF WOMEN

Soc'Y 463 (1991) (discussing changing ideas about how to count women's
household labor in census and statistical data). See also ANN CRIITENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHER-

WOMEN IN CULTURE AND

HOOD: WHY THE MOST IMPORTANT JOB IN THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED

(summarizing research on "the invention of the unproductive housewife").

45-64 (2001)
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household labor, but for most families child care historically was not as substantial
a part of this labor as it has become recently, especially among affluent households. 25 For example, Joan Williams observes that a popular mid-twentieth century storybook portrayed mothers' duties as primarily centered on the needs of
26
their husbands and homes rather than on entertaining or educating their children.
I want to distinguish nondependent caretaking work-caring for those who participate in paid labor-as an important part of the gendered household labor crucial to maintaining and developing capable human beings.
In her comprehensive and groundbreaking analysis of housework and the law,
legal scholar Katharine Silbaugh uses the term "housework" to include
nondependent care together with dependent care, and defines it as unpaid work
that meets the material needs of the family, as opposed to leisure. 27 Silbaugh
notes that taking childcare hours out of the calculation of aggregate housework
does not have as dramatic an effect as might be expected. 2 8 For example, she cites
1986 data about women's average combined home and family work that shows
child care counts for only about 200 hours a year of women's work on average out
of an annual total of 2416 hours, and about 58 hours of the average man's home
and family work a year out of an annual total of 2328 work hours. 29 Even though
such aggregate data obscures the importance of dependent care for individual families with children, or for society as a whole, it nonetheless suggests that the question of household labor should not be simply conflated with the question of child
care, or even dependent care broadly defined to include care of frail elders or adults
with disabilities. Another study from the mid-1980s of families with children found
that, excluding child care, mothers with paid labor force participation of more than
thirty hours per week performed thirty-two to thirty-seven hours a week of housework tasks; mothers not in the paid labor force performed forty-five to fifty-two
hours a week of unpaid housework. 30 For all fathers, this nonchildcare work ranged
31
from ten to fifteen hours a week.
Data on nondependent family care labor is necessarily elusive and contestable. The line between dependent and nondependent care work is inevitably fuzzy:
for example, an hour spent doing the family grocery shopping with a child in tow
is likely to involve overlapping time and effort devoted to serving the care needs of
both the dependent child and adult earner(s). In addition, the line between productive nondependent care labor and personal consumption or leisure always reflects
subjective and ideological judgments. A worker who takes the time to prepare and
eat a nutritious dinner with friends, for example, may be inextricably engaged in
both personal consumption and enhancement of her capacity for productive market labor.
In her analysis of the empirical data, Silbaugh follows a leading economic
32
convention, the third-party test, to distinguish unpaid care work from leisure. If
25. See WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 35-37 (discussing how child-rearing norms have changed
over time and with social class to emphasize more maternal labor for children).
26. Id. at 36 (discussing the Mrs. Piggle-Wiggle books of the late 1940s and early 1950s).
27. Silbaugh, supra note 23, at 10-11.
28. Id. at 11.
29. Id. at 11 n.37 (citing VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 78 (1988)).
30. Id. at 9-10 nn.27, 29 (citing analysis of a 1987 data set by David H. Demo & Alan C.
Acock) (citation omitted).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 11 (citing Ann Chadeau, What is Households' Non-Market Production Worth? 18
OECD ECON. STUD. 85 (1992)).
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the goods or services performed in the family could be provided by a third-party
seller--commodified in an arms-length market exchange-they count as work.
For example, cooking a meal is housework, eating it is leisure. Silbaugh gives a
typical list from sociological literature: preparing meals, washing dishes, house
cleaning, washing and ironing clothes, shopping, paying bills, yard work, driving,
and automobile maintenance. 33 This list leaves out other less quantifiable tasks
that may be nonetheless quite valuable and are often quite commodifiable-emotional support, managing social and community relationships, financial planning,
monitoring health and arranging for health care, providing entertainment, and sexual
34
satisfaction.
Another large and historically important category of common unpaid household care services includes informal and unpaid direct participation in family members' paid work and capital earnings. For example, unpaid family members of
workers or entrepreneurs often provide emotional support and motivation, practical advice, assistance with job searching, problem solving, and networking; they
may unofficially staff a family business or enhance the value of the family home
and other capital assets. Unpaid family members have commonly helped earners
with typing, research and editing, bookkeeping, errand running, entertaining, and
phone answering, for example. Obviously this list varies enormously by class and
nature of occupation: a Wall Street Journal article, for example, describes one
stay-at-home wife who hires nannies to take care of the kids so that she can use her
(unwaged) management skills for things like organizing a 150-person golf party
35
for her stockbroker husband's business associates.
Depending on class and other factors, many families commodify some of these
worker-care services. 36 Upper-class workers often receive many of these services
as job perks: high-status workers typically have executive secretaries who take on
many of the duties of the traditional wife, 37 and many high-income workers can
take advantage of employer-paid business meals, concierge services, home deco33. Id.
34. See, e.g.,

SUSAN MAUSHART, WIFEWORK: WHAT MARRIAGE REALLY MEANS FOR WOMEN

144-

55 (2001) (listing and criticizing the "job description" of wife and discussing "emotional caretaking" of the husband as a central wifely duty).
35. Alecia Swasy, Status Symbols: Stay-at-Home Moms Are FashionableAgain In Many
Communities, WALL ST. J., July 23, 1993, at Al.
36. BOYDSTON, supra note 18, at 136-37 (explaining that even though many middle-class men
in the nineteenth century enjoyed sufficient incomes to purchase their own maintenance services like room, board, clothing, and medical care, their ability to accumulate capital often depended on substituting unpaid wives' labor for these commodified services); NONA Y. GLAZER,
(1993)
(arguing that capital owners have shifted some of the costs of production to unpaid family labor

WOMEN'S PAID AND UNPAID LABOR: THE WORK TRANSFER IN HEALTH CARE AND RETAILING

by "decommodifying" some market services once provided for customers of retail and health
industries); Eleena de Lisser, How to Get an Airline to Waitfor Your Plumber,WALL ST. J., July
2, 2002, at D1 (describing a business trend whereby electronics and airline companies woo elite
customers by providing personal care services like shopping or even planning a wedding along

with their standard products).
37. LEGHORN & PARKER, supra note 20, at 121, 178-79 (discussing secretarial jobs as traditionally including tasks analogous to a wife's duties, including keeping the boss's social appointments, remembering the boss's family birthdays, giving emotional support, making coffee,
and perhaps even providing sexual service).
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rating, recreation facilities-or even Porsches. 38 In many affluent families,
commodified domestic labor may not decrease unpaid family care but instead may
allow families to redirect unpaid domestic services to new worker-care tasks. The
upper-class wife, for example, may spend substantial time managing household
help, shopping for high status household goods, and maintaining high status social
networks-all of which may be important to cultivating the breadwinner's market
39
success.
On the other hand, many less economically privileged families may skimp on
both unpaid family care work and commodified substitutions, and instead manage
with reduced or low quality nondependent care. For these lower-income workers,
doing without family or market care services may have long term costs: for example, eating at McDonald's regularly, delaying home and auto maintenance, or
40
failing to shop carefully can contribute to future economic and personal crises.
A worker's access to domestic care services has been central not just to gender and
class status but also to white racial privilege in the United States. Amy Dru Stanley
explains that, for many in the post-Civil War south "the exchange of a husband's
support for a wife's service at home symbolized white supremacy. '4 1 The idea
that access to wives' domestic services is important to maintaining white men's
social status has continued to ground twentieth century welfare policy, including
42
social security.
III. WORKER CARE AS A PUBLIC OR PRIVATE VALUE

Feminists have criticized conventional calculations of economic growth and
38. Case, supra note 10, at 1763, 1763 n.30 (giving example of law school policy offering
married professors free lunches apparently to make eating out with colleagues more comparable
to eating wives' "free" home-cooked meals); Pui-Wing Tam, Your CareerMatters: Silicon Valley Belatedly Boots Up Programsto Ease Employees' Lives, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2000, at B 1

(describing employers who provide worker-care services like picking up dry-cleaning from
workers' desks and renewing their drivers' licenses); Dale Buss, Workforce: A Breakaway Report on Employment Issues in Today's Market, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2000, at B 1 (giving examples of employer-provided dog grooming and Porsche loans); Mark Maremount & Laurie P.
Cohen, InteriorDesign on a Budget, The Tyco Way, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2002, at B 1 (describing employer-funded home decorating services, including an infamous $15,000 umbrella stand,
for Tyco's chief executive).
39. See BOYDSTON, supra note 18, at 137 (explaining how nineteenth century middle-class
wives' skill at making status-enhancing market purchases enhanced husbands' earning power
and social standing).
40. In her stint as a low-waged worker, journalist Barbara Ehrenreich gives examples of the
costs of inadequate time and money for basic personal care, such as a coworker who was faint
from skipped meals, and her own missed opportunity for a higher-paying job due to lack of
sleep.

BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKELED AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING

By

IN AMERICA

77-78, 148-

49 (2001).
41. STANLEY, supra note 18, at 189.
42. Historian Alice Kessler-Harris explains how the drafters of the family benefits provisions
for the Social Security retirement program made a policy choice to prioritize maintaining the
superior social status and personal satisfaction of already covered workers (mostly white, male,
and relatively well-off). The drafters elected to expand benefits by adding support for nonworking wives of these covered workers instead of expanding benefits to reach lower-income
workers and workers of color in excluded occupations. See KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 2, at
117-69.
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income for ignoring the substantial economic value of unpaid family labor.4 3 But
even if this labor is recognized as productive, the question remains who should be
responsible for bearing or avoiding the costs of creating this economic gain? As
the conventional economic wisdom asks, why should people with a proclivity for
the high-cost project of raising children deserve public support any more than those
with a personal penchant for driving fancy cars?
Many feminists have responded to this standard "Porsche Preference" argument, as Martha Fineman terms it, 44 by distinguishing child care as a source of
public economic benefit-regardless of the personal consumption value children
also may have to their parents or other caretakers. Some argue that child care is a
"public good" deserving of public support, rather than a private asset or liability,
because the productive benefits of child care spill over to society as a whole. 4 5
For example, well-raised children are likely to grow up to be workers who will pay
social security taxes that fund both nonparents' and parents' retirement benefits. 46
In this view, the public should share in the costs as well as the gains of the child
care that will produce future workers.
But switching the focus from care for children to care for workers complicates
the feminist "public goods" argument. "Nondependent" care work consists of tasks
commonly identified as highly private and-personal-devoting resources to caring
for the bodily needs of food, clothing, and hygiene is at the heart of conventional
ideas of private consumption. In addition, the consumption and production gains
from worker care services are more likely to overlap in time and space, blurring
the line between public spillovers and private returns. If family members' costly
care enhances current workers' productive value, then (in theory) family caretakers, and not taxpayers or employers, might be the ones who reap the rewards of
workers' increased economic value from good caretaking services. 4 7 With care
for workers, it is difficult to determine which care services enhancing the workers'
productive capacity should count as benefits for employers or society in general
and which services count as leisure benefiting the worker (or family) alone. Shopping for groceries and maintaining the car for transportation to work may be ser43. See, e.g., Lena Graber & John Miller, Wages for Housework: The Movement and the

Numbers,

DOLLARS AND SENSE

45, 45-46 (Sept./Oct. 2002) (reporting on efforts to count the

value of women's unpaid household labor in gross domestic product).
44.. Fineman, supra note 3, at 21 n.15.
45. See, e.g., Amy Wax, Is There a Caring Crisis?, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 327, 340, 340 n.41

(1999) (book review) (discussing the economic concept of "public goods" as positive externalities, or transactions that produce benefits to those who are non-paying strangers to the transaction); see also Nancy Folbre, Childrenas Public Goods, 84 ABA PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 86, 86
(1994) (arguing that those who do not contribute to child-rearing are "free-riding on parental
labor").

46. Nancy Folbre & Paula England, Who Should Payfor the Kids?, 563 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. Sc. 194, 199-200 (1999) (listing social security funding as one of many public
benefits produced by good child caretaking).
47. See Amy Wax, Rethinking Welfare Rights: Reciprocity Norms, Reactive Attitudes, and

The PoliticalEconomy of Welfare Reform, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257,278-80 (2000) (arguing that in the context of child care, even though mothers' unpaid labor may be productive, that
productivity may produce private benefits or public costs outweighing any public benefits); cf

Martha T. McCluskey, The Politics of Economics in Welfare Reform, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS
HoMo EcONOMICUS (Martha A. Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds.) (forthcoming 2003) (criticizing Wax's arguments about the public costs of welfare for single mothers).
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vices necessary for a worker to do her job well, but what about shopping for and
maintaining the Porsche that helps the upscale worker gain the respect of col48
leagues and clients?
The question whether the unpaid work of nondependent care deserves public
support raises more fundamental questions about how to draw the line between
production and consumption. Katherine Franke aims to complicate this line by
reversing the picture of public versus private gain represented by the self-sacrific49
ing mother on the one hand and the self-satisfied Porsche owner on the other.
Franke suggests that the Porsche consumer may produce positive public spillovers
that equal or exceed the value of raising children to be future social security funders.
She notes that demand for expensive cars may help boost manufacturing jobs, and
that acts of conspicuous consumption may promote national pride and loyalty or
social status. 50 Franke cites recent niche marketing-gay-targeted vodka ads and
the Rainbow Credit Card-as examples of private consumption that can contribute to public value. 5 1 Mothers, in contrast, may reap large personal and private
rewards from their children and may indeed direct their child-raising activity to52
ward undermining and resisting public values.
But this countervision of selfish moms draining public resources versus selfless yuppie Porsche buyers strengthening social welfare reinforces a division between production and consumption that constructs many women-and men-as
undeserving of public support. The privileging of upscale consumption as society-preserving productive work-the image of the selfless Porsche owner-is a
(well-marketed) product of prevailing "free market" ideology. The dominant
American economic and political vision often celebrates personal shopping choices
as a central path to civic virtue, individual freedom, and overall economic wellbeing. 53 The idea that private accumulation is the route to broader public benefits
has helped rationalize the U.S.-led neoliberal policies through which the World
48. See Elliot Spagat, EDS Ex-Colleagues Duel Over Who was the HeartierPartier,WALL

ST. J., Oct. 21, 2002, at A2 (reporting executives' arguments that perks like corporate-funded
flights to personal vacation homes and a lavish birthday party for an executive's wife--complete with string quartet, magician, tarot-card reader, full bar and ten dessert selections-were
justified on business grounds because clients were among the guests). Although parties for
executives' wives are often portrayed as particularly personal events, they might represent compensation (however inadequate) and inducement for wives' valuable unpaid services in support
of the company.
49. Franke, supra note 7, at 188.
50. Id. at 189. Whether these results are public benefits or public harms, however, depends
on one's political position and value judgments about what constitutes societal well-being.
51. Id. at 188-90. For criticisms of such "diversity marketing" that turns social and political
movements into "a giant shopping spree," see NAOMI KLEIN,'No LOGO: MONEY, MARKETING AND
THE GROWING ANTI-CORPORATE MOVEMENT 110-17 (1999) (rejecting nonetheless any nostalgia for
previous practices of anti-gay or heteronormative marketing).
52. Franke, supra note 7, at 191.
53. One example is the theory that Americans should express their patriotism in response to
the attacks of September 11, 2001 by going shopping. See, e.g., Stuart Elliott, Madison Ave.
Grappleswith Post-Sept. 11 Era, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2001; see also KLEIN, supra note 51, at
89-93 (giving example of marketing strategies linking corporate advertising for athletic gear

and fast food to enhanced funding for public education). Naomi Klein observed that in the
neoliberal world, "citizens [are] rebranded as empowered consumers who are nothing more than
a collection of their shopping habits." Susanna Lobez, Selling Ourselves Short, SUNDAY HERALD
SUN, Feb. 10, 2002, at 73.

20021

CARING FOR WORKERS

Bank, IMF, and national governments have redistributed resources around the world
from impoverished children, their mothers, and most workers to wealthy capital
owners. 54 In the prevailing economic theory, the global public gains most from
enhancing the richest peoples' freedom to spend as they choose-whether in
Porsches or political contributions to oppressive governments or in speculative
stock market schemes-by cutting taxes on the rich and by redirecting responsibility for basic human life-sustaining care services like health, education, water, and
55
fuel from the state to the private family.
In my view, the problem with this neoliberal theory of basic care as an expendable private consumption choice goes well beyond the failure to recognize
that even childfree Porsche owners might enjoy a few extra dollars from the social
security benefits that trickle up from devoting more resources to helping children
become future good workers. Instead, the problem is that the neoliberal definition
of publicly valuable production rests on value judgments that invoke and reinforce
a societal and moral order centered on class, gender, sexual, and race stratifica56
tion.
Arguments about whose personal choices count as public costs and whose as
public benefits inevitably assume rather than answer the question of who counts as
a responsible member of the public. The prevailing neoliberal ideology asserts
that the self-interested choices of the world's most affluent investors and consumers best represent overall public value and therefore deserve the most public support through policies emphasizing inflation protection, tax relief, enhanced polic57
ing of property rights, currency stabilization, capital mobility, and labor restraint.
Feminist arguments for public support for family care should depend not on denying or minimizing the personal choices and private gains involved in many women's
caretaking labor-for children or for workers-but instead should define the personal rewards and self-interested choices of mothers and other family caretakers
(paid and unpaid) as important measures of the public good deserving of public
support.
Martha Fineman's recent work directly confronts the prevailing neoliberal value
system by arguing that feminist attention to family care raises much broader questions about whose labor and whose private consumption choices get rewarded as
54. See Martha T. McCluskey, Subsidized Lives and the Ideology of Efficiency, 8 AM. U. J.
Soc. POL'Y & L. 115, 128-38 (2000) (arguing that neoliberal policies promoting "economic growth," measured in terms of the interests of wealthy capital owners, have led to devastating economic harm for much of the world's women and families).
55. See id. at 133-34 (discussing effects of "structural adjustment" policies on caretakers);
Martha T. McCluskey, Rhetoric of Risk and the Redistributionof Social Insurance, in EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon,
GENDER

eds., 2002) (discussing how free-market ideology rationalizes new public protection for intemational investors' freedom to pursue policies harmful to most workers and families).
56. See Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship:Challenging the Neoliberal
Attack on the Welfare State, IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2003) (analyzing "efficiency" arguments
against strong welfare rights for workers and single-parent families as grounded in norms of
race, class, and gender stratification).
57. See McCluskey, Rhetoric of Risk and the Redistribution of Social Insurance, supra note
55, at 158-64 (contrasting policies promoting risk-spreading and accepting "moral hazard" for
wealthy financiers with policies promoting personal responsibility and risk-bearing for most
workers and families).
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contributions to society as a whole. 58 Why should feminists rely on an ideology
that measures public gain in terms of diverse brand identities, 59 short-term shareholder profits, or even the stability of the existing social security system, 6 0 rather
than in terms of, say, the immediate health, happiness, and political freedom of the
vast majority of women (and men) on this planet who do not have the remotest
possibility of choosing to buy a Porsche? Fineman rejects the claim that the current distribution of societal resources reflects a natural or socially optimal market,
either for caretakers or for most workers. 6 1 Fineman concludes that while caretakers of children have particular claims for a greater share of public resources, other
forms of care work deserve greater support and reward too-including care by
62
workers for themselves.
Women's labor directed at developing and maintaining productive workersfuture or current-is unlikely to gain substantial public status if workers' value as
members of the deserving public depends on their contributions to the aggregate
Gross Domestic Product. Though a society that values workers' worth as human
beings rather than profit generators may be a necessary condition for valuing family care work, it is not sufficient, as feminist critics of Marxism and socialism have
long argued. 63 However, policies valuing women's reproductive labor (biological
and social) have not necessarily promoted women's value, as critics of feminist
64
matemalism often worry.
Franke warns that enhanced public support for child care can reinforce a
"hetero/repro norm" that fits the antifeminist tradition of making women's worth
depend on heterosexual and maternal service. 65 But to subvert that norm, it is
necessary to understand how white supremacy and class hierarchy are thoroughly
entangled with problematic historical and contemporary policies penalizing women
58. Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CH.-KENT L. REV. 1403, 1439-40
(2001).59. See KLEIN, supra note 51, at 110-18.
60. Here I am following Mary Anne Case's lead in reasoning that if feminists are going to
take the politically outlying step of challenging current market structures dealing with child

care, then it is not clear why we would need to accept the current structure of social security.
Case, supra note 10, at 1776.
61. See Fineman, supra note 58, at 1439 (noting that most workers have difficulty caring for
themselves in an increasingly workaholic economy).

62. Id. at 1439-40.
63. The Swedish welfare state, for example, goes' far to support workers and to promote class
equality, but retains gender segregation and subordination in occupations, politics, and family
work. See generally Brush, supra note 6 (discussing Yvonne Hirdman, Women-From Possibility to Problem? Gender Conflict in the Welfare State-The Swedish Model, Research Report 3,
Swedish Center for Working Life (1994)); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward a Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE
AND Soc'Y 635 (1983) (asserting a ground-breaking feminist critique of socialism and Marx-

ism).
64. See, e.g., MOLLY LADD-TAYLOR, MOTHER-WORK: WOMEN, CHILD WELFARE AND THE STATE,
1890-1930 (1994) (analyzing the problems of maternalism as the basis for welfare advocacy and
policy). "Privileging working mothers as the political subject of gendered welfare state studies
condemns us to women as logic-women as workers, women as mothers, women as carers."
See Brush, supra note 6. Brush argues instead that just as there is no single masculine political
subject, "the proper political subjects of feminist political sociology are women, in all our contradictory diversity." Id.

65. See Franke, supra note 7, at 196.
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who resist heterosexual motherhood, or privileging those who embrace it. To build
on Franke's terms, repronormativity is interdependent with "whitenormativity"
and "yuppienormativity." Dorothy Roberts describes how law condemns and constrains black mothering, targeting black women's freedom both to bear and to raise
children. 6 6 These racialized antirepronormative policies are not simply relics of
past enslavement and Jim Crow but have gained strength in recent years. Changes
in child welfare policies, for example, have resulted in the widespread, racially
disparate redistribution of children from the control of black mothers to state custody-and in the redistribution of black women's labor from care for their children
to wage work. 67 Similarly, Rickie Solinger traces how recent welfare policy changes
have increased the extent to which U.S. policies make motherhood a class privilege. 68 The welfare reform legislation of the 1990s, for example, reflects a norm
that women outside of middle- or upper-class marriage should forgo reproduction
and motherhood for wage work. 69 Tax and welfare policies in recent decades have
similarly entwined class privilege with the dominant heteropatriarchal reproductive norm by penalizing marriage for low-income mothers (or for other single per70
sons with dependents).
If heteronormativity and repronormativity is a product (and producer) of race,
class, and marital status, then public policies aimed at making child care a personal
responsibility of private families can in fact reinforce rather than resist the dominant heteroreproductive norm. 7 1 The more that "normal" mothering is a special
privilege reserved for white women legally attached to high-earning husbands, the
more the norm of women as mothers gains symbolic power to mark privileged
66.

DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE

(2002) (explaining

contemporary policies as a systematic effort to break up black families).

67. Id. at 180-200.
68. RICKIE SOLINGER,

BEGGARS AND CHOOSERS: HOW THE POLITICS OF CHOICE SHAPES ADOPTION,

ABORTION AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES

183-224 (2001).

69. See id. at 216-17 (contrasting Congressional glorification of nonworking middle-class

mothers with Congressional castigation of welfare mothers' interest in staying at home to care
for their children); GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE'S END 23-25 (1998) (explaining that welfare
reform policies reflected a race- and class-based ideology that poor single mothers and black
mothers should serve others rather than care for their own children).
70. See Adam Carasso & C. Eugene Steurle, How Marriage Penalties Change Under the
2001 Tax Bill, THE URBAN INSTITUTE 3, 5-6, at http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/41049l.pdf
(last visited May 30, 2002) (explaining that federal welfare and income tax benefits have been
designed to penalize marriage by single earners with dependent children); MCCAFFERY, infra
note 73, at 81-84 (explaining how the Earned Income Tax Credit and income tax disadvantage
low-income marital families compared to low-income unmarried persons). Tax law changes
enacted in 2001 reduce some of these marriage penalties for low-income taxpayers. See Carasso
& Steurle, supra.
7 1. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES

106-18 (1995) (linking recent welfare reforms restricting public

support for caretaking to efforts to reinforce a norm of a heterosexual, patriarchal family). Franke

notes that repronormativity applies to white, middle-class women and that, in contrast, reproduction has been treated as deviant for other women. Franke, supra note 7, at 195-96. But she
argues against a goal of assimilating all women to a white middle-class and heterosexual repro-

ductive norm. Id. at 196. In my view, the dominant reproductive norm cannot be successfully
challenged apart from a challenge to the race and class privilege with which it is thoroughly
enmeshed.
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social status. On the other hand, Franke and other critics of feminist maternalism are right to caution that policies that promote public support for women's
family care work may not necessarily support feminist goals of freeing women to
pursue identities beyond heterosexual reproducers.
To challenge heterosexual and reproductive norms, feminists must look more
carefully at the upper-class and white racial bias that shapes dominant ideology
about whose family care work and whose market work deserves public support
and whose remains a personal responsibility or expendable choice. At least with
regard to some important national economic benefits, public policy privileges not
simply heterosexuality or reproduction, but high-income earners married to an
unpaid family care worker-a group that is distinguished by class, gender, sexuality, and race as much as or more than by dependent care needs. Upper income (and
mostly male) married "breadwinners" with homemaking spouses typically receive
not only "private" unpaid family labor but also major transfers of taxpayer dollars
to support the domestic services that help sustain their market value and social
status. In particular, the federal income tax "marriage bonus" should be understood as a support system for the care of affluent husbands because it provides a
substantial special tax break to high-earning spouses (typically husbands) of
nonearning or low-earning homemakers (typically wives). 7 3 Similarly, the federal
social security system's spousal benefits provisions also have targeted special, generous benefits to relatively high-income workers married to homemaking spouses,
74
at the expense of unmarried workers and dual-earning married couples.
In short, turning attention to care for workers reveals that American public
policy has a long and lavish history of treating some individuals' needs for per72. Mary Romero, Unraveling Privilege:Workers' Children and the Hidden Costs of Paid

Childcare,76 CHi-KENT L. REV. 1651, 1668 (2001) (giving example of a child who recognized,

upon seeing the demands of a child in his mother's paid care, that access to his mother's care
was a privilege of race and class from which he was excluded).

73. The so-called "marriage bonus" results from the effect of joint taxation of married couples
combined with progressive tax rates scaled differently for married and single taxpayers. In
effect, high-earning breadwinners with noneaming or relatively low-earning spouses can shelter
some of their earnings in a more progressive rate bracket by treating their earnings as if they
were earned by the low-bracket spouse. For description and history of the marriage bonus, see
EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 16-19, 54-56 (1997). See also Dorothy A. Brown, The
Marriage Penalty/Bonus in Black and White, 16 N.YL. ScH. J. HUM. RTS. 168, 168-81 (1999)
(analyzing the marriage bonus as a racially disparate subsidy favoring white families, who are
more likely to conform to the homemaker/breadwinner model---especially at upper income levels). I develop this analysis more fully in Martha T. McCluskey, From Worker Care to Husband

Care: Rethinking Support for Family Caretaking Labor (unpublished manuscript on file with
author).
74. In essence, social security's old age program provides extra, noncontributory benefits to
married workers with nonearning or relatively low-earning spouses; equal-earning married couples
with comparable household earnings pay more in taxes and get fewer benefits and unmarried
earners get fewer benefits for comparable tax contributions. See Goodwin Liu, Social Security
and the Treatment of Marriage:Spousal Benefits, EarningsSharing, and the Challenge of Reform, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 1, 1, 12-21 (explaining and criticizing this spousal benefit system). For
a discussion of the spousal benefit scheme and the distributive effects of social security, see C.
EUGENE STEUERLE & JON M. BAKIJA, RETOOLING SOCIAL SECURITY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: RIGHT*&

WRONG APPROACHES TO REFORM 80-81, 111 (1994). See also McCluskey, supra note 73 (further
developing this critique of social security's spousal benefits as an "affluent husband care subsidy").
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sonal care services as not just an expendable personal consumption choice but as
valuable and necessary to public well-being. From this vantage point, expanding
public support for care to those excluded from the current system does not require
special treatment for mothers and children or for low-income working families. It
does, however, require challenging ideologies of gender, sexuality, class, and race
that have long made public care support a marker of superior citizenship status.
Contrary to some critics of enhanced support for child caretaking, the people most
likely to burden the public with their family caretaking costs are not parents in
general (as popular author Elinor Burkett claims) 75 or single mothers in poverty
(as legal scholar Amy Wax suggests) 76 but well-off male breadwinners in traditional marriages to homemaking wives.
The problem with existing worker care policies, in my view, is not that workers' personal consumption of care services gets public support, but that public support for worker care is directed primarily at workers who can most afford to pay
for their own basic care services and who are most likely to rely on an unpaid
spouse for that labor. In effect, by targeting higher-income families and homemaker/breadwinner marriages for caretaking support, these current policies promote (sometimes luxurious) care services for workers who do not pay their care
provider. Instead, I advocate revising the system of public support for workers'
care so that public support is redirected to the basic care needs of low- and moderate-income workers and to paid care work-as well as to unpaid care work performed by workers for themselves or by relatively equal-earning spouses. This
could be accomplished by revising family tax and social security support to tie
benefits to individual low and modest earnings rather than to high earnings, mari77
tal status, and to unequal marital earnings.
IV. BRIDGING FEMINIST CARETAKING DIVIDES
Reframing the question of public support for family care work to examine
support for worker care could shed new light on the three areas of feminist conflict
over family caretaking discussed at the beginning of this essay. First, more equitable support for caretaking for workers would help mitigate the home/market
tradeoff between supporting women as family caretakers or as market earners.
Most workers depend on substantial noncommodified domestic labor and substantial commodified care services in order to maintain their market earnings and personal well-being. Policies that better support care services for workers could encourage and reward both market earnings and family labor (whether or not
commodified) at the same time.
Whether labor is more liberating and meaningful, or less oppressive and alienating, when it is formally exchanged as a market commodity or when it is given as
uncommodified family care has been a perennial feminist question. The answer
inevitably depends on the social and historical context in which a particular worker
75. See generally BLURKETr, supranote 10 (claiming that parents ingeneral are most likely to
burden the public with family caretaking costs).
76. Wax, supranote 47, at 276-79 (contrasting single mothers, whom she claims risk impos-

ing public costs, with parents in breadwinner/homemaker marriages, whom she assumes are
economically self-sufficient).
77. I will expand on the possibilities for reforms in a future article. See McCluskey, supra
note 73.
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and her work are situated. Both market labor and nonmarket home work have
functioned to maintain and resist gender subordination. 7 8 Rather than deciding
which of these forms of labor deserves primary public support, perhaps feminist
efforts should be directed at easing the tough tradeoffs between these two kinds of
work. Policies that more equitably support care for workers could help reduce the
potential costs of both market earning and unpaid home care for most women and
men.
The current tax and social security system's support for worker care both penalizes and privileges commodified market earnings by targeting family support
to breadwinner/homemaker marriages. 79 In effect, those who specialize in market
earnings get special support for their family care services (regardless of dependents), but only if they have a spouse without substantial market earnings who is
therefore likely to be available for unpaid domestic care service. Workers who
specialize in market earnings are essentially excluded from family care benefits
(or even penalized through higher taxes) if they rely on either commodified domestic services or on their own uncommodified self-care in place of the services of
80
a nonearning or unequal-earning spouse.
Correspondingly, this system also encourages some noncommodified family
labor: that of spouses (regardless of dependents) who specialize in nonmarket
labor and who are married to workers with relatively high market earnings. On the
other hand, this current family support system disfavors noncommodified family
labor provided by those with their own substantial market earnings in families
without a nonearning or low-earning spouse. Unmarried persons, and married
couples without a one homemaker/one breadwinner division of labor, miss out on
this system of public support for their care needs regardless of whether they pursue
market earning or unpaid family care.
The supposed tradeoff for feminists between supporting women as homemakers or as market earners rests in part on an assumption that current policies favoring breadwinner/homemaker marriages further the goal of supporting women's
noncommodified family labor (even if only for some women). 81 In this view,
eliminating special benefits for breadwinner/homemaker marriages might further
the alternative goal of increasing women's commodified labor, but at the expense
78. Compare

LINDA

K.

KERBER,

No

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES

47-80 (1998) (ex-

plaining how vagrancy laws were used to force newly-freed African American women to serve

white masters rather than their own families), with Schultz, supra note 7, at 1928-63 (imagining
reforms that would make wage work liberating and rewarding for women).
79. Edward J. McCaffery, The Burdens of Benefits, 44 VILL. L. REV. 445, 459-60 (1999)
(linking the income tax and social security systems as policies that favor breadwinner/homemaker marriages).
80. The current tax and social security systems penalize both unmarried earners and married
dual-earners compared to married high-earners with homemaking spouses. The income tax
imposes the "marriage penalty" on equal-earning couples as the result of a 1969 rate change that
somewhat reduced the relative disadvantage of single taxpayers. MCCAFFERY, supra note 73, at
64-69 (tracing the history of the marriage penalty). The tax law reform package enacted in 2001
reduces the income tax marriage penalty for some families, but increases the relative disadvantage of unmarried taxpayers.
81. See Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices,

96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2035-36, 2059-64 (1996) (arguing that the income tax and social security policies favoring breadwinner/homemaker marriages support women as unpaid caretakers).
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of women who prefer noncommodified family care. 82 In my view, however, policies directing special benefits to breadwinner/homemaker marriages can instead
be understood as a support system for worker care-a subsidy for domestic services for certain breadwinners. From that perspective, a policy change directed at
redistributing that family support from well-off workers in certain kinds of marriages to low- and moderate-income market earners could in fact increase support
for uncommmodified family service and for many unpaid women family caretakers.
If low- and moderate-income workers (regardless of marital status) shared in
the family tax benefits available to well-off breadwinner/homemaker marriages,
for example, this income boost might enable them to work fewer hours for pay
(forgoing overtime or a second or third job) and to instead spend more time on
uncommodified care for themselves or for family members. Over the last several
decades, many American families have relied on increased substitution of wives'
commodified work for unpaid family care or leisure to maintain their middle-class
status in the face of falling real wages. 83 By doing so, these families, along' with
many unmarried workers, have lost not only leisure or quality of care (or both), but
also additional income because of the prevailing policies that privilege breadwinner/homemaker families for family care support. Redirecting family support to
dual-earner marriages and unmarried earners will help support those most likely to
have to sacrifice uncommodified work for market earnings. Although homemaking wives of upper-income breadwinning husbands do often benefit under the current system from the extra support to their households, this support is structured to
make uncommodified caring a high-risk option even for these wives. The current
system of bonuses for breadwinner/homemaker marriages conditions caretaker
support on continued marriage to a breadwinner with continuing high earnings and
on the caretaker's continued abstention from substantial market earnings. If family care support were redirected from breadwinner/homemaker marriages to individual workers with low and moderate earnings, it could better support many women
who sacrifice some market earnings for uncommodified family care.
On the other hand, if moderate- and low-income individual workers had similar tax relief for their family care as the current system provides to well-off breadwinner/homemaker marriages, then most women also would receive more support
as market earners. Care benefits for workers scaled progressively to individual
earnings would increase incentives for equal distribution of market earnings within
marriages. Both unmarried and married women who prefer market labor to family
care could receive the extra breadwinner tax relief (and extra household social
security benefits) now limited to the few breadwinning women who have both
high earnings and nonearning or low-earning husbands. That extra earnings support could enable women workers to receive more and better care services in the
82. Id. at 2016-23, 2059-64 (arguing that the current marriage-based income tax and social
security policies pose an inevitable tradeoff between supporting women as market earners or as

unpaid family caretakers).
83. Middle-class married families increased their annual hours of nonhousehold work by
more than three weeks a year between 1989 and 1996. LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF
WORKING AMERICA, 1998-99, at 17-18 (1999). It took approximately 500 more hours of wage
work to make the average U.S. family income in 1997 than in 1977. Doug Henwood, Bullet
Dodged?, 86 LEFT Bus. OBSERVER, Nov. 18, 1998, at 1.
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market-hiring housecleaners or eating out, for instance, in place of their own
unpaid self-care. And a system that redirected family support from unpaid homemaking spouses to all low- and moderate-income workers would better support
caretakers who sell their domestic services in the market as commodified labor
(typically low-earning or moderate-earning women without well-off husbands and
84
often immigrants or women of color).
Even some homemaking wives in well-off marriages might benefit from policies redirecting family support from the current system's "affluent husband care"
to equitable worker care. The current system, as critics have argued, penalizes
wives of affluent breadwinning husbands who wish to increase their market work. 85
If these family support benefits were redirected to support the care needs of individual earners, then homemaking wives could receive a tax break to offset the
increased pecuniary costs of increasing their market earnings. Although affluent
breadwinners married to homemakers would lose from a policy change redirecting
their special support to low- and moderate-income workers regardless of marital
status, high-earning workers with homemaking spouses are the group that needs
the least support for their care services. High-earning breadwinners not only have
more ability to pay for commodified care than lower-earning breadwinners, but
also have more spendable income than similarly-earning breadwinners in dualearning marriages or than two unmarried persons with similar combined household income. Households with noncommodified workers can avoid some of the
extra costs of market earnings and of market purchases of commodified care (taxes,
commuting, and work clothes, for instance). 86 Tying family support to individual
workers' earnings levels rather than to marital status and spousal division of labor
would eliminate the current economic disadvantages for breadwinners at all income levels who prefer to be single or to be in relationships outside of heterosexual marriage, or who prefer marriage to an equal-earning spouse.
Second, focusing on care for workers helps disentangle the feminist dilemma
of whether supporting women as mothers disadvantages women as individuals
with nonmaternal interests. More equitable public support for workers' personal
care could help mothers and other earners with dependent care responsibilities by
freeing up more of their family's income or uncommodified time for diverse forms
of family care work, for dependents or others. But more equitable public support
for workers' personal care needs could also help other women and men who eschew family labor and instead want to devote more time or money to pursue their
preferred ways of enriching mind, body, and spirit. If workers as well as dependents are care receivers, public care support can become a means of enhancing not
just the well being of children or parents but of adult workers in all kinds of family
situations.
84. See generally Donna E. Young, Working Across Borders: Global Restructuring and
Women's Work, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 1 (discussing the global trade in commodified household

work).
85. Edward McCaffery criticizes these policies for creating a "secondary earner bias." See
MCCAFFERY, supra note 73, at 19-20, 95-97.
86. See JULIE A. NELSON, FEMINISM, OBJEcTiVITY, AND ECONOMICS 100-04 (1996) (explaining
that two-earner couples have less leisure and more need for money to pay for market goods to
replace household labor). Nelson ties the policy choice to favor homemaker/breadwinner marriages to a gender ideology that discounts the economic value of home production. Id. at 104.
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Existing tax policy directs substantial resources to the family care needs of
affluent breadwinners regardless of dependents, though mothers and children in
these families often share in these benefits. If public care support for earners were
redirected to offer more support to workers of modest- and low-income, regardless
of marital or parental status, then most mothers would also benefit-because most
mothers are either modest- or low-income earners themselves or share a household
with one. Unmarried mothers and mothers in dual-earning marriages are left out
of the current family benefit scheme, which privileges affluent breadwinner care
over dependent care. But nonmothering women who are unmarried or who are in
equal-earning (or low-earning) marriages are also disadvantaged under the current
scheme.
The current scheme's emphasis on supporting spousal care (typically by wives)
for high-earning breadwinners (typically husbands) reflects and reinforces a normative preference for white, heterosexual, male-headed, and upper-class or uppermiddle-class marital families. Challenging this scheme privileging affluent breadwinner/homemaker families would not only benefit the mothers it excludes but
also might help undermine heteronormativity and repronormativity. "Family values" advocates often single out these families as the norm for both reproductive
and productive labor, constructing them as the ideal of personal responsibility in
both home and market. The public virtue of the well-off breadwinner/homemaker
marital family, however, is in part grounded in its false status as self-sufficient
compared to "dependent" single mothers in poverty. 87 By recognizing the lavish
current tax support for family care going exclusively to these households, 88 we
can help reconstruct both single mothers and nonmaternal workers as deserving of
comparable public support for their labor.
Third, bringing care for workers into the foreground of caretaking discussions
offers a way out of the pleasure/dependency dilemma that Franke identifies as a
problem for feminists. By expanding the idea of family care work to include personal care for nondependents, feminist caretaking advocacy can support not just
self-sacrificing labor for others but also self-satisfying pleasure and recreation.
Family law has traditionally supported men's heterosexual care desires by requir89
ing sexual services as a central part of wives' domestic duties to their husbands.
87. For example, Amy Wax contrasts the supposed self-sufficiency of the breadwinner/homemaker family with the "dependent" single mother in poverty in developing her theory that pub-

lic support should go to those who make efforts to help themselves and to minimize public costs.
Wax, supra note 47, at 276-77.
88. The federal income tax system's income-splitting provision for jointly filing married
couples subsidizes high-earning breadwinners married to nonearning or low-earning spouses at
an annual rate of $33 billion in the mid-1990s. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR
(1997) (discussed in Lawrence Zelenak, Doing
Something About MarriagePenalties: A Guide for the Perplexed, 54 TAX. L. REV. 1, 1 (2000)).
WORSE: MARRIAGE AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX

This tax break exceeds the annual $22 billion spent on AFDC in the early 1990s.

MICHAEL B.
KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP: REDEFINING THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 318 (2001).
89. See HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN & WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 306-07 (2000) (attributing the

failure to criminalize rape in marriage until the late twentieth century to the persistent idea that
sexual intercourse is a legal right of husbands in marriage). See also, e.g., SUSAN MAUSHART,
WIFEWORK: WHAT MARRIAGE REALLY MEANS FOR WOMEN 176 (2001) (arguing that "for many
married women, sex is simply another form of wifework-another way in which women routinely service the physical and emotional needs of their male partners at the expense of their
own"). Jean Duncombe & Dennis Marsden, Whose Orgasm is this Anyway? 'Sex Work' in
Long-term HeterosexualCouple Relationships,in SEXUAL CULTURES: COMMUNITIES, VALUES AND
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Existing policies giving public support to affluent breadwinners married to homemakers have similarly helped maintain some married men's access to pleasureenhancing personal care services. 90 A feminist revisioning of nondependent care
should not deny the value of care services aimed at enhancing individual earners'
physical and emotional happiness. Instead, feminists should challenge the historical practice of providing public support for such services on the basis of gender,
sexuality, race, and class status. If access to basic personal nondependent care
services-including leisure-were given more support as a right of all workers
rather as a duty of wives or as a right of husbands (or other affluent breadwinning
spouses), this care support could foster women's pursuit of self-interested attention to their own desires rather than women's service to others. 9 1 As Martha
Fineman concludes, "we have responsibilities to ourselves-to regenerate our energies and resources, to participate in the artistic, nonmaterial, spiritual, or other
inner-directed aspects of life upon which we are all dependent for our individual
92
well-being."
Franke argues that legal feminists have concentrated on sexual harm and dependent care as the two primary concerns facing women. 93 She wonders whether
feminist law could affirm women's freedom to pursue pleasure and desire instead
of simply protecting women from dependency and danger. 94 As one step toward
responding to Franke's challenge, changing existing laws to support worker-care
more equitably might provide the material support that would better enable more
women to shift their time from service to others-in home or market-to selfsatisfaction.
The current legal system structures a political economy that requires many
women to sacrifice not just leisure but basic needs like sleep and health for long
hours of work putting others' needs first in both home and market in order to survive. Different tax, benefit, and labor laws could better give more workers the
material capacity to devote more time, money, and energy to satisfying their own
desires for pleasure. Lillian Rubin's study of working-class families in the late
twentieth century found that the demands of long work hours at low pay made
finding time and energy for sex, or even for going to the toilet, a major challenge. 95
If law treated all laboring women's personal care needs as a central public valueas important as their contributions to future corporate profits, social security funds,
or Porsche production-we might be one step closer to a world that better supported women's power to satisfy their own sexual and other desires.
220-38 (Jeffrey Weeks & Janet Holland eds., 1996) (discussing perceptions that sex in
heterosexual relationships-however pleasurable and freely chosen-was also a form of work
performed by women for their male partners).
90. For example, the Congressional debate over whether to set a lower social security retirement age for wives than for husbands focused on whether (typically older) husbands should
have the "great comfort" of a (typically younger) wife at home during old age. KESSLER-HARRIS,
supra note 2, at 160 (quoting comment by Robert Kean).
91. I am indebted to comments by Vicki Schultz for this insight.
92. Fineman, supra note 58, at 1439.
93. Franke, supra note 7, at 182.
94. Id. at 181-83.
95. LILLIAN B. RUBIN, FAMILIES ON THE FAULT LINE 96-99 (1994), quoted in WILLIAMS, supra
INTIMACY

note 2, at 155.
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CARING FOR WORKERS
IV. CONCLUSION

My focus on care work for nondependent workers raises questions about the
intersection of economic class, race, marital status, and gender in feminist legal
analysis of family caretaking. Feminists have gone far toward the important goal
of raising public awareness of the critical economic and social value of dependent
care work performed predominantly by women. But perhaps the care work that is
necessary to sustain workers is difficult to make visible as a public concern because the needs of low- and moderate-income workers, like the needs of most
children and child caretakers, are marginal to dominant class-biased and racialized
ideas of the public well-being. Advocates of neoliberal "free market" economic
theory have pushed the idea that private families must take more personal responsibility for providing (or doing without) the resources necessary to support most
market earners' basic needs and desires, like the resources needed to support most
women's reproduction or most children's productive development. Nonetheless,
recent pro-marriage tax law changes increase the extent to which well-off married
breadwinner/homemaker families (regardless of dependents) get public support
for their personal care needs. Feminists can better support most women's home
and market labor-as well as their particular personal pleasures-by working toward a system of public support for caretaking of workers that is not restricted to
the limited number of families who conform to the class, race, sexual, and gender
norms of the traditional affluent breadwinner/homemaker marriage.

